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INTRODUCTION
The main objective of this study is to provide empirical evidence of the relation between earningsannouncement timing and technical analysis signal. This research is the extension of . They provide evidence that technical analysis signal before earnings announcements can generate profitable return. This study develops the idea by analyzing the timing of earnings announcements to explain the profitability of technical analysis signal.
This study is important for several reasons.
The first reason, technical analysis tends to produce better performance in developing market than that in developed market (Fifield et al. 2005; McKenzie 2007; Hartono and Sulistiawan, 2014) . The second, technical analysis is competing information to fundamental information, including accounting information (Franchis et al. 2002; Flanegin and Rudd 2005; . The third, technical analysis signal is useful in anticipating earnings announcements . Using international data, Hartono and Sulis-tiawan (2015) also provide evidence that technical analysis become more important when global stock markets decline. The need of competing information increases when accounting quality decreases. Later (earlier) announcements will produce lower (higher) information content. Delaying accounting information also stimulates the use of competing information. In this case, technical analysis is needed. Using market microstructure theory, this study believes that there are two types of market participants, noise traders and informed investors. Informed investors have access to private information. They can get benefit from preannouncement activities (Black 1986 ). This study believes that noise traders may use technical analysis signal to detect informed-investors reaction before earnings announcements, especially for late announcers. That statement is supported by the study of . They give evidence that investors react before earnings announcements, and their activities are captured by technical analysis. This study develops that idea by using earnings-announcement timing. The earlier (later) announcers generate lower (higher) return based on technical analysis signal before earnings announcements.
Previous studies provide evidence that good (bad) news will be announced earlier (later), for example Kross (1982) in US, Whittred (1980) in Australia, and Haw et al. (2000) in China. This study also develops those previous researches by using earnings-announcement timing as the determinant of technical analysis performance. Earlier (later) earnings announcements are expected to reduce (increase) information leakage risk so that it produces lower (higher) reaction before earnings announcements. Technical analysis signal produce better (worse) performance in detecting price reaction when reporting lag is longer (shorter).
In general, these research give evidence that (1) later (earlier) announcers produce higher (lower) technical analysis return, (2) reporting lag positively affect technical analysis performance. Price movements before earnings announcements generate reliable technical analysis signals, especially in "buy signal" sample. These results suggest that the tendency of information leakage of late announcers can be detected by technical analysis signal.
The main purpose of this study is to examine the impact of earnings-announcement timing on technical analysis signal using Indonesian data.
Earnings-announcement timing is represented by two factors; there are (1) the timeliness of earnings announcements, and (2) reporting lag. The first issue is company intention to announce earnings based on stock-market authority rule. The second issue is related to the speed of announcements. This study use technical analysis performance to show that preannouncements reaction can be detected by technical analysis signal. It means that noise traders can use stock price to anticipate informed investors activities before earnings announcements.
There are several contributions in this study. First, this research develops earnings announcement studies. The studies on earningsannouncement timing have been widely discussed, but the impact on technical analysis performance around earnings announcements is only showing a prospective. This study bridges the gap between earnings-announcements timing and technical analysis studies.
Second, this study develops the issue of competing information to accounting information by using technical analysis signal. Francis et al. (2002) stimulate the idea of competing information in earnings announcements and the study of using technical analysis signals as competing information. This study expands that research by adding reporting lag variable. That is the duration between financial report date and its announcements.
Third, this study supports stock market regulators to make policy related to the timing of earnings announcements. The regulator is expected to do more discipline enforcement on announcementtiming policy. And fourth, this study proposes trading strategies around earnings-announcement dates for retail investors. Retail investors can use charts to detect informed investors reaction around earnings-announcement dates.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPO-THESES
This study uses market microstructure theory to develop the relation between two issues, namely (1) earnings-announcement timing, which has been widely discussed in accounting (Sengupta, 2004) , and (2) technical analysis research (Fifield et al. 2005; McKenzie 2007 , Metgalchi et al. 2012 ). Those issues are on different research stream. This study attempts to combine those issues.
Based on the theory, informed investors use their access to exploit inside information before announcements. Using technical analysis, noise traders may detect preannouncement reaction of informed investors. The study of gives the evidence about that phenomenon. This study develops that idea to explain the performance of technical analysis signal around earnings announcements using earningsannouncement timing.
The Impact of Timeliness Announcements to Technical Analysis Performance According to capital market authority in Indonesia, companies" financial statements must be submitted no later than the end of the third month after the date of financial statement. It means that the maximum reporting lag is three months. Reporting lag from managements will give different signals to the market. When managers have crucial private information, they have obligation to share new information to the market to minimize information asymmetry. It means that delaying announcements will decrease relevancy of information. In Indonesia, Wirakusuma (2006) presents how timely reports affect earnings informativeness. Hence, the extent of an earnings announcement will provide ""useful"" information to market participants that it should be a function not only of the nature of information released but also when it is released (Sengupta 2004) . Timely financial statement information helps in efficient allocation of resources by reducing dissemination of asymmetric information. Timely announcements may also mitigate insider trading, leaks and rumors in the market.
Decreasing accounting quality improves usefulness of competing information. As competing information, technical analysis signal utilizes reaction before earnings announcements, especially reaction on late earnings announcement. Late announcements stimulate more informed investors to take advantage of their superior information. Their activities before earnings announcements can be detected by noise traders by using technical analysis. The reliability of signal is presented by technical analysis performance. The higher (lower) technical analysis return represents more (less) reliable signal. Based on that idea, the first hypothesis is presented as follows. H1: Late (early) earnings announcements produces higher (lower) return based on technical analysis signal before earnings announcements.
Reporting Lag and Technical Analysis Performance
It is apparent that earnings information is not the only superior information. It is said so because there is much information outside financial statement that is used by investors (Francis et al. 2002) . Managers should set the earnings release date based on their evaluation of potential benefits (and costs) of releasing earnings information quickly. This behavior affects the reporting lag. However, it is longer for firms with greater block ownership (Sengupta 2004) . This is also consistent with the argument that firms respond to pressures from investors to release earnings quickly. Firms that have large block ownership, however, are less susceptible to such pressures and they have little incentive to produce higher earnings informativeness.
Reporting lag stimulates the tendency of information leakage. In this condition, technical analysis may be useful. Technical analysis is competing information for fundamental analysis, especially in anticipating short-term price reaction (Flanegin and Rudd 2005) present that technical analysis is competing information. Franchis et al. (2002) also argue that idea. In Indonesia, give evidence about the role of competing information to earnings announcements.
This study predicts that the role of technical analysis is increasing when reporting lag is high. Reporting lag decrease information content on earnings-announcement dates, while it stimulates preannouncements reaction. In effect, the ability of technical analysis signal to generate profits will increase before earnings announcements. The speed of earnings announcements will improve the quality of accounting information. High quality of accounting information reduces the usefulness of competing information. Technical analysis as competing information decreases its usefulness when reporting lag is short. To test the hypothesis, this study uses absolute speed as contrary term of reporting lag. The greater reporting lag presented, competing information become more important.
Supporting reporting lag phenomenon in Indonesia, Landsman et al. (2012) shows that Indonesia is a country that presents its reporting lag which is relatively larger than other countries. It means that those reporting lag can be exploited by technical analysis signal before earnings announcements. This study predicts that reporting lag stimulates information leakage, and the reaction before announcements can be detected by technical analysis signal. According to that prediction, the hypothesis can be stated as follows. H2: Reporting lag positively affect return based on technical analysis signal before earnings announcements.
RESEARCH METHOD Data Collection
This study uses Indonesian stock market data. Indonesian market is a developing market and many researches show that earnings informativeness is low in Indonesia (Landsman et al. 2012 ) while the stock price produces high quality technical analysis signal (McKenzie 2007; 2015) . Those phenomena improve the context of this study.
Listed companies in Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) are selected. Earnings-announcement dates are determined when firms formally submit their annual financial statement to stock exchanges authority. Confounding effect should be eliminated to isolate the effect of earnings announcements. Dividend, stock split/reverse, right issue, and merger are corporate action. This study also eliminates those actions because those may cause market reaction. The dates are used here as a surrogate of earnings-announcement dates commonly used in US stock market.
Variables and Measurements
Variables and the Measurements Earnings-announcement dates are determined based on submitting date to IDX. Based on this information, Statusi,t and Rli,t can be determined. Statusi,t represent the timeliness of earnings announcements. It is a categorical variable, with value 1 (0) for late (early) announcer i in year t. Companies that announce before (after) March 31 st are (earlier) later announcers, because they are (timely) not timely based on Indonesian stock market regulation. Rli,t is reporting lag firm i in year t. Reporting lag is determined by the duration between earnings announcement and financial-statement date. The data of earnings-announcement dates are acquired from Indonesian Capital Market Library (ICAMEL).
To determine buy (sell) signal before earnings announcements, this study needs to create charts of firms that are analyzed. This study uses SMA5 as technical analysis indicator because it is very popular in practice and widely use in investing communities. Many providers of technical analysis software also use that indicator as a default indicator. SMA5 also gives the greatest probability of producing returns over longer period (Milionis and Papanagiotou 2008) , and the use of a single indicator and simple is better than composite indicator (Metgalchi et al. 2012) . SMA5 for firm i in year t can be measured as follows. SMA5i, t=(P5i, t + P4i, t+P3i, t + P2i, t + P1i, t ) 
P5i,t is stock price of firm i on 5 days ago in year t. P1i,t (P2i,t) is stock price of firm i on 1 (2) days ago in year t. Based on that measurement, SMA5 chart is generated and combined with stock price chart. Technical analysis signal can be produced using this equation. tBSi= (P0, i>SMA50, i) .
(2) tSSi= (P0, i<SMAn0, i) .
(3) The notation tBSi (tSSi) is a signal to buy (sell) that appears on the stock i. Buy signal occurs when the stock price the day 0 of firm i (P0,i) cross up SMA5 line of firm i on the day 0 (SMA50,i) where in the previous day stock price of firm i (P-1,i) is lower than its simple moving average (SMAn-1,i). This study uses one signal before earnings announcement dates as an opening signal and one signal after that as a closing signal.
Technical analysis return is calculated based on the difference of stock price between those signals. Rtbi,t is technical analysis return before earnings announcement for firms i in year t. If technical analysis signal is tBSi then Rtbi,t equal to equation (4). If the signal is tSSi then Rtbi,t equal to equation (5). ,t= -[(Pa,i,t -Pb,i,t)/Pb,i,t] (5) Notation RtbSBi,t (RtbSSi,t) represent that technical analysis return is generated from price on buy (sell) signal before earnings announcements on stock i on year t compared to price on sell (buy) signal after earnings announcements. Yet, Pb,i(Pa,i) is the closing price at the time itSBi and tSli before (after) earnings announcements. In measuring return, this study not only use closing price but also highlow price on the day of tSBi (or tSli). Return based on high-low daily price is also needed to anticipate daily price fluctuation. To isolate technical analysis return around earnings announcements, this study adjusts technical analysis return by (1) market return, and (2) risk and market return. In this procedure, stock beta is calculated using one-year estimation based on daily data.
The descriptive statistics of variables are presented in Table 1 . Based on the data on Table 1 , all of technical analysis returns are positive. It means that returns based on technical analysis signal before earnings announcements are reliable. Based on the data, the average of reporting lag (Rli,t) is almost 60 days. It means, on average, observed sample already announces their earnings in two-months after fiscal year. This is faster than the requirements. This study predicts that delaying announcements degrade those technical analysis performances.
Hypotheses Testing
This study uses firm level in the measurement of variables where subscript i represent the stock of a company, and t represents the year. H1 predicts that Rtbi,t,late>Rtbti,t,early. Rtbti,t is return based on technical analysis signal before earnings announcement date for stock i for year t. Rtbti,t,late(Rtbti,t,early) is Rtbti,t for late (early) announcer. This study also complements the test by controlling size and technical analysis signal. Previous studies show that firm"s size determines the reaction around earnings announcements because larger firms more in the news (Scott 2009 ). This article uses market capitalization to represent size (SIZEi,t). In technical analysis signal, there is a tendency of asymmetry reaction between buying (selling) signal (McKenzie 2007) . This study complements the asymmetry reaction on technical analysis signal.
The second hypothesis predicts that reporting lag positively affect technical analysis performance. The empirical model presented as follows.
Rtbi,t = d + d1.Rli,t + d2. SIZEi,t + d3. Signali,t + (fixed effect) + e1
(6) Return based on technical analysis signal before earnings announcements is represented by Rtbi,t.Rli,t is reporting lag firm i in year t. SIZEi,t is market capitalization of firms i in year t. Fixed effect controls years.
To improve the results, this study also uses robustness check. This step is needed to convince that different methodologies give the same conclusion. Related to return measurement, this study uses different price reference (closing and high-low) and different reaction measurement (market adjusted return and abnormal return based on market model). Related to the second hypothesis, this paper also separates buy and sell sample to show how the signal moderate the relation between reporting lag and technical analysis return. This step is expected to improve the discussion.
RtbBSi,t = f + f1.Rli,t + f2. SIZEi,t + e2 (7) RtbSSi,t = g + g1.Rli,t + g2. SIZEi,t + e3
(8) RtbSBi (RtbSSi) represent that technical analysis return is generated from price on buy (sell) signal before earnings announcements on stock i on year t compared to price on sell (buy) signal after earnings announcements.
DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
Empirical support for this contention is provided in this section. This paper first documents the impact of timeliness and reporting lag of earnings announcements on the return of technical analysis signal before earnings announcements. Then, this research also enhances the quality of findings by conducting robustness test and exploring the implication of these results.
Timeliness and Technical Analysis Signal
This study believes an idea that late announcements stimulate different reactions from investors. Late announcements degrade earnings informativeness and generate low reaction on earningsannouncement dates. That phenomenon produce higher tendency of information leakage and produce higher price reaction before earnings announcements. More reactions produce reliable technical analysis signals before earningsannouncement dates, while lower reaction after earnings announcements generates less reliable signals .
Technical analysis return is positively skewed. Using central limit theorem, this study argue that normality is not a crucial problem. That belief is also supported with the article of Brown and Warner (1985) that also gives evidence about the importance of alternative measurement to test the hypothesis to get conclusive results in measuring security return. To improve the results, this study also examines using many methods of return measurement. Using univariate test, H1 is tested using independent sample t-test. It is presented in Table  2 . Table 2 reports the difference technical analysis return based on the timeliness of announcements. Using different measurement of return, the table shows that late announcers produce higher technical analysis return than early announcer. Using Rtbi,t,close, (Rtbi,t,hl) the return of late announcements 7.8% (10.13%), but that of early announcements is only 3.78% (5.98%). Using market adjusted return (ExRtbi,t,), late announcements also generate bigger return than early announcements. The same results also presented by this research sample using ARtbi,t,hl and ARtbi,t,close. Using equal variance which is not assumed, in all samples, except ARtbi,t,hl sample, the differences are significant. Late (early) announcements generate higher (lower) technical analysis return. Based on this preliminary test, H1 is supported.
Improving the findings, this study complements the test of H1 by using ANOVA. The results are presented in Table 3 . After controlling the impact of timeliness to technical analysis return using signal and size, the findings are presented in Table  3 . In all methods, the timeliness of earnings announcements significantly affects technical analysis return before earnings announcements. The table also shows that interaction between timeliness and signal (T x S) affect technical analysis return. It means that the relation of timeliness to technical analysis return is also affected by its signal (buy or sell signal). Using many measurement of return, this study implicitly presents the robust finding.
Reporting Lag and Technical Analysis Signal
Substantially, the first hypothesis is almost similar to the second one. If H1 focuses on the timeliness, then H2 on the reporting lag. Higher reporting lag indicates the tendency managements to delay information to public. Longer reporting lag stimulate more reaction before earnings announcements, then, price reactions are more easily detected by technical analysis signal. This study predicts that longer (shorter) reporting lag produce higher (lower) technical analysis return. Using panel least square, the results of these tests are presented in Table 4 . That is unbalanced panel observation.
The tests on all samples above present evidence that reporting lag positively affect technical analysis return. Using Rtbi,t,close and Rtbi,t,hl, regression equations produce t-value 1.793435 and 1.942372 in lag coefficient which are statistically significant at 5% for both of them. In samples that use ExRtbi,t,close and ExRtbi,t,hl, the tests show that tvalue in lag coefficients are 1.725654 and 1.861137 which are also significant at 5%. For ARtbi,t,close and ARtbi,t,hl sample, the t value are 1.701121 and 1.715616 which are statistically significant at 5%. The results conclude that H2 is supported. 
Discussion
Earnings announcement studies discuss the reaction on earnings announcements including factors that determine the reaction (Scott, 2009 ). Landsman et al. (2012) observe market reaction in many countries. The study of Mrying (2006) and DeFond et al. (2007) are also one of the examples. This study is also an earnings-announcement study. Although it is classical topic in accounting, this study expands the idea using technical analysis indicators to observe asymmetry reaction based on the duration of reporting lag. The use of technical analysis is an important part of this study, because earnings announcement and technical analysis are different issues. Using market microstructure theory, this study builds a bridge between those issues. Technical analysis studies focus on technical analysis return (Milionis and Papanagioutu 2008; Metghalci et al. 2012) . That is the profitability of technical analysis using time series data. This study develops technical analysis research by using event-studies in technical analysis research. This idea develops previous studies; and . The first, its focus is on the reliability of technical analysis signal before and after earnings announcements. The second, its focus is on the role of technical analysis signal as competing information. This study develops it using reporting lag and its impact to technical analysis return.
Using different measurement and statistical test, this study presents that timeliness of earnings announcements affect return of technical analysis signal before earnings announcements. Late (early) announcements produce higher (lower) technical analysis return because late announcements stimulate informed investors exploit preannouncement information. Noise traders who have no information will use the news as discounted information. To anticipate "buy on rumors sell on news" phenomena, this study recommend the noise traders to analyze preannouncement reaction using technical analysis before earnings announcements, especially for late earnings announcements. The idea is supported with data.
H1 is supported, but it doesn"t mean that technical analysis signals from early earnings announcements are unreliable. The data shows us that technical analysis return from early announcements sample still produce positive return. It describes that technical analysis signal before earnings announcements is a profitable signal.
In the second hypothesis, reporting lag positively affect technical analysis return. Using panel least square, this study presents robust results. Furthermore, this paper also separates buy and sell signal sample. The separation is conducted to get deeper understanding about the result. Overall, H2 These findings indicate that "buy on rumors and sell on news" phenomenon is bigger for firms that tend to delay earnings announcements. News on earnings announcements are discounted when there are preannouncements reactions. To anticipate this problem, this study uses technical analysis signal. The results are as expected.
These findings have implications to market microstructure theory. Informed investors reaction can be detected by noise traders using technical analysis signal. That phenomenon shows that technical analysis signal synchronizes private to public information. In short, this study may build a bridge between earnings-announcements timing and technical analysis studies. This paper also has methodological implications in terms of identifying reaction of announcements using technical analysis signal.
The prediction of this study is supported by the data. Although the results are robust, this study should be developed in several aspects. First, future researches may use inter-countries 
